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OLIVE HUDSON, Respondent, v. JAMES HUDSON, 
Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Tempora.ry Alimony-Jurisdiction: Permanent Ali-
mony.-Neither alimony, temporary or permanent, nor costs 
and fees can be awarded if no valid marriage between the 
parties ever existed. 
[2] ld.-Temporary Alimony-Jurisdiction: Financial Condition ' 
of Parties.-When a valid marriage is admitted and the issue 
before the court is the validity of an ex parte divorce, the 
trial court may grant the wife temporary alimony, costs and 
fees to enable her to attack the ex parte divorce if she demon-
strates her need for the award and her husband's ability 
to pay it. 
[S] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Wife's Right to Support.-
Since the due process clause forbids the divorce court to 
adjudicate the absent wife's right to support, she cannot be 
deprived by that court of whatever rights of support she had 
under the law of her domicile at the time of divorce. 
[4] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Meet on Property Rights of Absent 
Spouse.-In a divorce action in a foreign state on constructive 
service, the court there has authority to adjudicate status 
(in rem) of a person residing in thnt state, but has not juris-
diction to adjudicate away (in personam) any of the then 
vested property rights of the absent spouse who does not 
reside in such state, who is not personally served with process 
in that state and who does not appear in the action. The 
personal rights of the spouses in property not within the juris-
diction of the acting court remain subject to litigation in the 
proper forum. 
[5] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Meet on Right to Support.-If a for-
eign ex parte divorce does not terminate the right to support 
.arising out of the marriage, a fortiori it does not terminate 
the right to support formally established and defined by a valid 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, ~§ 173, 176; Am. 
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 607 et seq. • 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 322; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, §§ 947, 989. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, §§ 17R. 198; [:!] Divorce, 
§§ 178, 180(1); [3-5, 7, 9, 12] Divorce, § 304; [6] Divorce, §§ 178, 
304; [8] Husband and Wife, §4; [10] DivO\"('e, §200; [111 Divorce, 
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separate maintenance decree, and that right therefore con-
tinues until modified or terminated in appropriate proceed-
ings. (Overruling Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762, 68 P.2. 
351.) 
[6] Id. ~ Temporary Alimony - Jurisdiction: Foreign Divorce.-
Civ. Code § 137.2, together with other sections concerning ali-
mony and support (§§ 136, 139), specifically authorize courts 
to award alimony and support during actions for divorce or 
separate maintenance and govern the case of a domestic divorce 
in which the court has jurisdiction of both parties, but are 
not concerned with a case involving a foreign divorce. 
[7] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Full Faith and Oredit: Effect of De-
cree.-If a husband's ex parte foreign divorce decree is valid, 
the state Suprellle Court must give it the full faith and credit 
required by the federal Constitution: that is, the court must 
recognize that the parties are no longer married and that no 
divorce can be granted the wife. Once this fact is established, 
Civ. Code, §§ 136, 137.2, 139, concerning alimony and support, 
become irrelevant, since they. deal solely with the award of 
alimony in divorce eases. 
[8] Husband and Wife - Marital Rights and Duties. - A wife's 
right to support arises from the marriage and is recognized 
by statute (Civ. Code, §§ 155, 174). It is not created by a 
divorce decree i the decree is simply one means of enforcing 
the right. 
[9] Divorce - Foreign Divorce - Effect on Right to Alimony.-
Where there was an existing marriage at the time the wife filed 
an action for divorce and permanent alimony in this state and 
thereafter the husband filed a divorce action and obtained an 
ex parte divorce decree in another state, if the foreign decree 
dissolved the marriage the wife's prayer for divorce was 
moot and only her prayer for permanent alimony remained to 
be adjudicated, since the foreign decree, even if valid, did not 
and could not terminate the wife's right to alimony under 
California law. 
[10] Id. - Permanent Alimony - Jurisdiction in Equity. - The 
power to decree alimony falls within the general powers of a 
court of equity, and exists independent of statutory authority. 
In a proper ease it may be granted in an action other than 
for divorce. 
[11] Id. - Permanent Alimony - Existence of Marriage as Pre-
requisite. - The broad proposition that alimony cannot be 
granted if the marriage has been dissolved is true if the mar-
riage was dissolved in this state and the court had jurisdiction 
over both spouses, but this proposition cannot be extended to 
cover a ease where a marriage has been dissolved by an ex 
parte foreign divorce decree procured by the husband, since 
C) 
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the ex parte proceeding doe~ not affect the wife's support 
rights, which remain open for determination in a proper forum .. 
<Overruling Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Ca1.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528.) 
[12] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-8ince a 
wife who filed an action for divorce and permanent alimony 
in this state prior to the time the husband filed an action for 
divorce and secured an ex parte divorce decree in another state 
can maintain her action for permanent alimony without at-
tacking the husband's foreign decree, she may receive tempo-
rary alimony, costs and fees to enable her to continue the suit 
when she has shown that she needs such relief and that the 
husband has the ability to provide such assistance. 
[13] ld.-Temporary Alimony-Appeal-The Supreme Court will 
not upset a trial court's award of temporary alimony unless 
the circumstances show as a matter of law that the trial court 
has abused its discretion. 
[14] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Amount of Award.-Wbere the 
evidence in the wife's divorce action showed that her expenses 
exceeded her earnings by $63 per month, that she was making 
payments on the parties' home, that her take-home pay was 
$70 per week, that her husband's take-home pay was $89 per 
week during the time the parties lived in the state and he 
received a pension of $33 per month, and that she anticipated 
increased expenses in maintaining the action, and where the 
husband did not contend that he was unable to pay the modest 
amount of $65 per month ordered by the trial court, it could 
not be said as a matter of law that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding this sum as temporary alimony. 
[15] ld.-Restraining Orders.-Where the evidence in a wife's 
divorce action showed that the husband had threatened to 
prevent the wife's enjoying any of the property in the event 
of a divorce and that in his foreign divorce action he had 
prayed to have sole title to the California property vested in 
him, the trial court properly sought to preserve the property 
until such time as the parties' rights therein could be deter-
mined, and its order restraining the husband from conveying 
the California property was not an abuse of discretion. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County granting temporary alimony, attorney's fees, 
court costs and other relief. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Af-
firmed. 
George Porter Tobin for Appellant. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from an order grant-
ing plaintiff temporary alimony, attorney's fees, court costs, 
and other relief in her action for divorce and permanent 
Jllimony. 
o The 0 parties were married in Reno, Nevada, on May 3, 
1947. They moved to California in 1950, and plaintiff is still 
domiciled in this state. Defendant left their home on April 
6, 1957, announcing his intention to go to Reno, obtain a 
divorce, and return in about six weeks. Plaintiff filed her 
action on April 22, 1957, and defendant was personally served 
in Idaho on May 16, 1957, Defendant filed his action for 
divorce in Idaho on May 21, 1957, and plaintiff was person-
ally served in California. Plaintiff did not appear in the 
Idaho proceeding, On June 14, 1957, she obtained an order 
to show cause why she should not be granted relief pendente 
lite in the California action. On the same day, defendant 
appeared by his attorney in the California action and de-
murred to plaintiff's complaint. The Idaho court granted 
defendant a final decree of divorce on June 19, 1957. Defend-
ant introduced this decree in the California proceeding and 
resisted the order to show cause on the ground that the 
decree had dissolved the marriage. Plaintiff intr('lduced evi-
dence tending to attack the validity of the Idaho decree. Th~ i 
court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that 
a marriage existed and granted the requested relief. 
Defendant contends that the Idaho divorce decree must be 
given full faith and credit (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1); that 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant alimony unless 
the parties were married; that even though on a proper show-
ing a wife may obtain temporary alimony, costs, and fees 0 
to enable her to attack an ex parte decree, plaintiff cannot, 
on the ground that her attack upon the decree is weak and 
inconclusive; and that even if the Idaho decree did not auto-
matically terminate plaintiff's right to support, the order 
must still be reversed on the ground that the court abused 
its discretion in determining the amount of the award. 
[1] Neither alimony, temporary or permanent, nor costs 
and fees ca,n be awarded if no valid marriage between the 
parties ever existed. (Dietrich v. Dieirojelt, 41 Ca1.2d 497. 
502-504 [261 P.2d 269] ; Hite v. Hite .. 124 Cal. 389, {391·395 
[57 P. 227, 71 Am.St.Rep. 82, 45 L.R.A. 793] ; In re Cook, 
42 Cal.App.2d 1, 3 [108 P.2d 46].) [2] When a valid mar-
riage is admitted, however, and the issue before the court 
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grant the wife temporary alimony, costs, and fees to enable 
her to attack the ex parte divorce if she demonstrates her 
need for the award and her husband's ability to pay it . 
.(Kopasz v. Kopasz, 34 Ca1.2d 423, 424-425 [210 P.2d 846] ; 
Baldw·in v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406, 417 [170 P.2d 670]; 
Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Oal.App.2d 117, 127 [242 P.2d 
41].) Recent District Oourt of Appeal decisions would add 
another condition: the wife must prove that her attack on 
the ex parte divorce is made in good faith and with a rea-
sonable probability of success. (Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal.App.2d 
666, 676-677 [199 P.2d 766]; Kalrll1ls v. Kalmus, 103 Cal. 
App.2d 405, 420-423 [230 P.2d 57] ; cf. Ottinger v. Ottinger, 
141 Oal.App.2d 220, 225 [296 P.2d 347].) The addition of 
this condition is based on the theory that the entry of a 
valid ex parte divorce automatically terminates the marriage 
and a fortiori marital obligations and rights, including sup-
port rights. (Knox v. Knox, supra, at 676.) To avoid this 
effect of the ex parte divorce, the wife must demonstrate that 
the divorce court was without jurisdiction; only if she can 
show that she is likely to succeed can her husband be required , 
to furnish the necessary funds. We need not determine 
whether plaintiff has met this condition, for the theory upon 
which it is based is inconsistent' with the recent decision of 
the United States Supreme Oourt in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 
354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ot. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456]. 
Following the Williams cases (W·illiams v. North Caro-
lina I, 317 U.S. 287 [63 8.0t. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 
1273] and Willi.am.s v. North Carol-ina II, 325 U.S. 226 [65 I 
S.Ot. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366]), the question 
arose whether a valid ex parte divorce entered at the domicile 
of only one party to the marriage automatically terminated 
the wife's right to support. This question was settled by the 
theory of divisible divorce, foreshadowed in Esenwein v_ 
Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 281-283 [65 8.0t. 1118, 89 L.Ed. 
1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396] (concurring opinion) and set forth 
in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 [68 S.Ot. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 
1 A.L.R.2d 1412], where the court heM that an ex parte 
Nevada divorce procured by the husband did not terminate 
the wife's prior adjudicated right to separate maintenance: 
"The result ill this situation is to make the divorce divisible-
to give effed to the Nevada d('cree insofar as it affects marital 
status and to make it ineffective 011 the issue of alimony. 
It accommodates tIle interests of both Nevada and New York 
in this brokl'n marriage by restricting each State to the 
o 
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matters of her dominant concern." (Id., at·549.) Finally, 
in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, the court perfected the 
divisible divorce theory by its holding that even when the 
wife's right to support had not been reduced to judgment 
before the ex parte divorce, that divorce could not affect her 
SUpport rights. The court rested its holding on the due process 
clause: since the foreign state had no personal jurisdiction 
over the absent spouse, its decree ". . . to the extent it pur-
ported to affect the wife's right to support, was void and 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York 
to give it recognition." (Id., at 419.) [3] Since the due 
process clause forbids the divorce court to adjudicate the 
absent wife's right to support, it follows that she cannot be 
deprived by that court of whatever rights of support she had 
under the law of her domicile at the time of the divorce. I 
(Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389,394 [317 P.2d 987].) 
The crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the 
law of California permits plaintiff to obtain support follow-
ing the entry of an ex parte divorce. Of the 33 jurisdictions 
that have passed on this question, 23 states and the District 
of Columbia have held that a wife may obtain support or 
alimony following the entry of an ex parte divorce. (White 
v. White, 83 Ariz. 305, 307-309 [320 P.2d 702] ; Wagster v. 
Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 906 [103 S.W.2d 638] ; Davis v. Davis, 
70 Colo. 37, 41 [197 P. 241] ; Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 
839,847 [App.D.C.]; Pawley v. Pawley, (Fla.) 46 So.2d 464, 
471-473 [28 A.L.R.2d 1358], cert. den. 340 U.S. 866 [71 
S.Ct. 90, 95 L.Ed. 632]; Durden v. Durden, 191 Ga. 404. 
408 [12 S.E.2d 305] [only if wife's suit for divorce and 
alimony was filed before the entry of husband's ex parte 
divorce] ; Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 156-157 [117 N.E.2d 
65] ; Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206 Iowa 1075, 1079 [221 N.W. 
837]; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 178 Kan. 62, 65-67 [283 
P.2d 428] [by statute] ; Davis v. Davis, (Ky.) 303 S.W.2d 
256, 257; Parker v. Parker, 211 Mass. 139. 144 r97 N.E. 
988] : Malcom v. Malcom, 345 Mich. 720, 725-727 [76 N.W. 
2d 831]; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn. 24, 27-28 [4 
N.W.2d 785]; Bodie v. Ba.tes, 95 Neb. 757, '764-770 [146 
N.W. 1002, L.R.A.N.S. 1915E 421], second appeal, 99 Neb. 
253 [156 N.W. 8], reversed on other grounds, 245 U.S. 520 
r38 S.Ct. 182, 62 L.Ed. 444]: Woodh01tSe v. Woodhouse. 
17 N .• I. 409, 411-412 [111 A.2d 631] [by statute] ; Vanderbilt 
v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 349-351 [135 N.E.2d 553] [by 
Oct. 1959] HUDSON'V. HUDSON 
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statute], affirmcd, 354 U.S. 416 [7i S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1456] ; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 410-411 
[123 N.E.2d 267], affirmed, 350 U.S. 568 [76 S.Ct. 629, 100 
L.Ed. 705); Spradling v. Spradling, 74 Okla. 276, 277-279 
[181 P. 148}; Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.L 55, 56-58 [94 A . 
. 685). [contested divorce) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 345-
:346 [24 N.W.2d 327); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 
491-492 [131 S.W. 977, Ann. Cas. 1912C 284, 34 L.R.A.N.S. 
1106); Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 237 [198 P. 165); 
llicks v. Hicks, 69 Wash. 627, 630-631 [125 P. 945); Ische v. 
Ische, 252 Wis. 250, 260-263 [31 N.W.2d 607,32 N.W.2d 70].) 
Several of these cases rest upon familiar theories of jurisdic-
tion: either that the divorce conrt had not decided the issue of 
alimony (e.g., Ische v. Ische, su.pra, at 260-263; Hicks v. 
Hicks, supra·, at 630; Malcom v. Malcom, supra, at 726), or 
that the divorce court, having no jurisdiction over the wife, 
could not <mt off her right to alimony (e.g., Armstrong v. 
Armstrong, supra, at 410). The more recent cases accept 
the divisible q.ivorce theory, emphasizing the dominant con-
cern of the wife's domiciliary state in protecting her right to 
support from a husband who seeks to avoid his duties by 
obtaining an ex parte divorce in a foreign state (e.g., White 
v. White, supra, at 307-310; Hopson v. Hopson, supra. at 844; 
Pawley v. Pawley, supra, at 472; Wt1loughby v. Willou.ghby, 
supm, at 66-67; Davis v. Davis, Ky., supra, at 257; Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, at 350-351; see also Morris, Divisible 
Divot'ce, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1287). 
Although this precise question has not been settled in this 
state, certain rules have been established in related cases. 
We have held that an Illinios wife could enforce an Illinois 
support order entered subsequent to her husband's ex parte 
Nevada divorce (Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389,394 [317 P.2d 
987] .) Although we invoked the Vanderbilt holding in the 
Lewis case, we there applied Illinois law and ,vere not called 
upon to determine the force of the Vanderbilt case upon our 
own law. Similarly, in Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Ca1.2d 465 
[283 P.2d 19), we held that a New Jersey wife could enforce a 
New Jersey separate maintenance decree entered before the 
husband's ex parte Nevada divorce. Again, New Jersey law 
provided the rule of decision and we followed the Supreme 
Conrt's similar holding in the Estin case. The Estin rule ,vaR 
applied under California law in a casc holding that an ex parte 
Nevada decree did not terminate a wife's right to receive 
permanent alimony awarded in a prior California interlocu-
() '< 
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tory di,orce decree. (Campbell v. Campbell, 107 Cal.App.2d 
732, 734-736 [238 P.2d 81].) We have also held that a wife 
cannot recover separate maintenance, as distinguished from 
alimony, following the entry of a valid ex parte divorce pro-
cured by the husband. (DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Ca1.2d 
521, 523 [165 P.2d 457] ; Kalmus v. Kalmlls, 103 Cal.App.2d 
'405,423 [230 P.2d 57] ; Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal.App.2d 666, 676 
r199 P.2d 766] ; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Cal.App.2d 838, 
842·843 [187 P.2d 113] ; Calhoun v. CalhoulI, 70 Cal.App.2d 
233,236-237 [160 P.2d 923]. [In a second action between the 
same parties, the wife asked for permanent alimony. The 
court held that the prior separate maintenance action was an 
estoppel against the prosecution of another action for support 
and refused to decide whether the wife could have originally 
sued for alimony. Calholll! v. Calhollll. 81 Cal.App.2d 297. 
304-305 [183 P.2d 922] ;] c/. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Ca1.2d 276, I 
279 [169 P.2d 633].) The distinction betwcen separate mainte-
lJanCe, which depends upon an existing marriage (Monroe v. 
S1tpm'ior COllrt, 28 Ca1.2d 427,429-430 [170 P.2d 473]), and 
alimony, which follows the dissolution of the marriage by 
divorce, is also made by'several other states that permit ali-
mony but not separate maintenance following an ex parte 
divorce. (Pawley v. Pawley, supm, at 474-475; compare 
Willoughby v. WWoltghby, supra, with Lowry v. Lowry, 174 
Kan. 526, 529 [256 P.2d 869]; compare Parke,' v. Parker, 
supra, with CltitUck v. ChitHck, :332 Mass. 554, 555 [126 
N.E.2d 495].) In this respect, howevcr, a distinction must 
be drawn between the enforcement of a preexisting decree of 
separate maintenance and the securing of a decree of separate 
maintenance after a foreign ex parte divorce. Although the 
court cannot grant separate maintenance to a party who is not 
. married, it does not follow that an existing support right 
formalized in such a decree automatically terminates on the 
dissolution of the marriage. [4] "In a divorce action in a 
foreign state upon constructive service the court there has 
authority to adjudicate status (in rem) of a person residing 
in that state but has not jurisdiction to ailjudicate away (in 
personam) any of the then vested property rights of the absent 
spouse who t1o~s not re;;iue in SI1('h stat!', who" is not per-
sonally served with pro('ess in that state and who iloe!'! not 
appl'ar in thc adioll. 'I'he Jl{'rsonal right!'! of the spouses in 
property lIot within the jnri;;diction of the ading court re-
main subjc(·t to litigation in tIle proper forum. It seems to 
me that the right of a wife, or ill a proper ease tlle husband, 
C) 
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to s1Ipport from the other spouse as of the date of the divorce 
is a property right which can be adjudicated only by a court 
. having jurisdiction iu personam." (Schauer, J., concurriug 
in DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Ca1.2d 521, 527 [165 P.2d 457].) 
. [5] If, as we have concluded, a foreign ex parte divorce does 
not terminate the right to support arising out of the marriage, 
a fortiori it does not terminate the right to support formally 
established and defined by a valid separate maintenance de-
cree, and that right therefore continues until modified or 
terminated in appropriate proceedings. Cardinale v. Car-
dina.le, 8 Ca1.2d 762 [68 P.2d 351], is to the contrary, but 
that case was decided before the theory of divisible divorce 
was established in Estin v. Estin, supra, 334 U.S. 541, and is 
overruled. 
Defendant contends, however, that section 137.2 of the 
Civil Code requires an existing marriage as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite for the granting of alimony pendente lite. 
[6] Section 137.2, together with the other sections of the 
Civil Code concerning alimony and support (§§ 136, 139) 
specifically authorize courts to award alimony and support 
during actions for divorce or separate maintenance. These 
sections, however, govern the case of a domestic divorce in 
which the court has jurisdiction of both parties. They are not 
concerned with a case, such as this one, involving foreign 
elements. In the normal divorce case, the parties are of i 
course married: if they are not married, there can be no 
divorce. [7] If defendant's Idaho decree is valid, we must 
give it the full faith and credit required by the Constitution 
of the United States: that is, we must recognize that the 
parties are no longer married and that no divorce can be 
granted to plainti1f. Once this fact is established the sections 
of the Civil Code invoked by defendant become irrelevant, for 
they deal solely with the award of alimony or support in 
divorce cases. [8] A wife's right to support arises from the 
marriage and is recognized by statute. (Civ. Code, §§ 155, 
174.) It is not created by a divorce decree; the decree is 
simply one means of enforcing the right. We do not imply 
that plaintiff has mistaken her remedy. [9] At the time her 
action was filed there was an existing marriage; but if the 
Idaho decree dissolved the marriage, ller prayer for divorce 
iH moot and only her' prayer for permallE'llt alimouy remains 
to be adjudicated. 'fhe Idaho decree, eveu if valid, did not 
and could not under the Vandf'rbilt dedsion, terminate plaiu-
tiff's right to alimony under the law of this state. 
o 
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[10] Defendant contends that our courts can grant alimony 
only in an action for divorce, on the ground that it is only in 
such an action that the statutes provide for alimony. This 
contention was answered adversely to defendant as early as • 
1869. In Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, a wife sued her 
husband for alimony without asking for a divorce. The 
s~tutes. contained no provision for alimony save in an action 
for divorce. The husband cOIltended that the statutes were 
exclusive and that the court lacked power to grant alimony 
in any other case. The court held that it had general equity 
powers to grant alimony in cases aside from those specifically 
provided for by statute and answered the husband's conten-
tion in these words: "The Legislature was not dealing with 
the general subject of alimony, as an independent subject-
matter of legislation; but only, as one of the incidents of an 
application for divorce. It saw fit to define the power of the 
Court over the allowance of alimony on an application for 
divorce; but was not considering the subject of alimony in 
any other class of cases. If it had provided that a writ of 
11e ezeaf or distri11gas might issue against a defendant in an 
action for divorce, it would scarcely be claimed by anyone 
that this was equivalent to a declaration that such writs should 
not issue in any other class of actions. For the same reason, a 
provision for alimony in a suit for divorce is not to be con-
sidered as a declaration that alimony shall not be allowed in 
other actions." (Id., at 267-268. See also Pa:z:ton v. Pa:z:tOll, 
150 Cal. 667, 670-672 [89 P. 10831; Livingston v. Bu.perior 
Court, 117 Cal. 633, 634-636 [49 P. 836, 38 L.R.A. 1751 ; and 
Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 87, 92 [118 P. 445], allowing 
temporary alimony pending suit for annulment despite the 
absence of express statutory authorization; c/. Bernard v. 
Bernard, 79 Cal.App.2d 353,356-357 [179 P.2d 6251.) 
[11] In Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516 [254 P.2d 528], 
however, a majority of this court held that a wife's right to 
rE'cover alimony or support for herself is limited to the period 
when the parties are husband and wife. The Dimon case was 
decided before the Vanderbilt case and must be reexamined 
il1 the light of that case. 
The broad proposition of the Dimon case that alimony 
cannot be granted if the marriage has been dissolved cannot 
be denied, if the marriage was dissolved in this state and the 
court had jurisdiction over both SpOUISt'S. (See Long v. j,()lIg, 
17 Ca1.2d 409,410 [110 P.2d 3831; Tolle v. Su.perior Court, 10 
Ca1.2d 95, 97-98 [73 P.2d 607].) But the Dimon case ex-
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tf'lIdf'd this proposit.ion to ('oVf'r a f'3Se where the marriage 
had been dissolvf'd by an rx part.e Connecticut decree pro-
cured by the wife. The wife's right to support from her hus-
band had not been adjudicated prior to the divorce decree as 
in the Estin case. After Est·in, but before Vanderbilt, the 
. argument could have been made that by terminating the mar-
. riage the ex parte divorce automatically terminated all rights, 
including the nonadjudicated right to support that grew out 
of that marriage. But after the Vanderbilt case, such a 
proposition cannot be maintained, for it is now clear that the 
ex parte proceeding does not affect the wife's support rights. 
By treating the Connecticut decree as terminating any pos- . 
sibility that the plaintiff in DimO'1l- could secure a support 
award in this state, we gave that decree more weight in this 
state than it is now constitutionally entitled to receive. To 
follow Dimon after Vanderbilt in a case involving a foreign 
ex parte divorce is to permit the court of another state to 
preclude the courts of this state from deciding a question of 
California law that the foreign court had no jurisdiction to 
determine. Under Vanderbm the conclusion is inescapable 
that the issue of alimony which could not be decided by the 
divorce court, remains open for determination in a proper 
forum. The Dimon case is therefore overruled. 
The doctrine of divisible divorce set forth in Estin and . 
Vanderbilt provides a sensible solution to the problems en- (I 
gendered by ex parte divorces. Its repUdiation in this case 
would compel collateral attacks upon such divorces to protect 
rights to support, with resulting confusion as to marital 
status, property rights, rights of innocent third persons who 
may have relied· upon the decree, and the legitimacy of 
children. (See Powell, And Repenf At Leisure, 58 Harv.L. 
Rev. 930.) California has a dominant interest in the well-
being of her domiciliaries, and the courts of this state are 
open to adjudicate their support rights following an ex parte 
divorce. 
[12] Since plaintiff may maintain her action for perma-
nent alimony without attacking defendant's Idaho decree, 
it follows that she may receive temporary alimony, costs, and 
fees to enable her to continue the suit when she has shown 
that she needs such relief and that defendant has the ability 'I 
to provide such assistance. (Sweeley v. Swecley, 28 Ca1.2d 
389, 390 [170 P.2d 469].) [13] This court will not upset a 
trial court's award of temporary alimony unlells the circum-
;tances show as a matter of law that the court has abused 
() 
746 HUDSON v. HUDSON [52 C.2d 
its discretion. (Baldwi,~ v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 413, 
417-418 [170 P.2d 670] ; Swcclry v. Sweeley, supra, at 393-
394.) [14] Defendant contends that the combined income 
of· plaintiff and her minor son by a former marriage exceeded 
his own earnings by $1,600 per year. Defendant fails to C011-
sider, as the trial court evidently did, that plaintiff's son 
"ras about to enter college and was unable to contribute to 
his mother's support. The evidence showed that plaintiff's 
expenses exceeded her earnings by $63 per month; that she 
was making the payments on the parties' California home; 
that her take-home pay was $70 per week, although her 
husband's take-home pay had been $89 per week during the 
time the parties lived in California and he received a pension 
of $33 per month; and thli.t she antieipated increased ex-
penses in maintaining the present action. Defendant does 
not contend that he is unable to pay the modest amount of 
the award ($65 per month) ordered by the trial eourt. On 
this record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
[15] Finally, defendant objects to that part of the order 
that restrained him from conveying the California property. 
The evidence showed that defendant had threatened to pre-
vent plaintiff's enjoying any of the property in the event 
of a divorce and that he had prayed to have sole title to the 
California property vested in him in the Idaho proceedings. 
The trial court properly sought to preserve the property until 
such time as the parties' rights therein could be adjudicated; 
its order was not an abuse of discretion. 
The order appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., Peters, J., and 
White, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the order for the sole reason 
that, in my opinion, the facts are analogous to those in Baldwin 
v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406 [170 P.2d 670], where the con-
trolling rule of law is stated at page 416 et seq. 
